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Abstract
Past estimates of the eﬀect of family income on child development have often been plagued
by endogeneity and measurement error. In this paper, we use an instrumental variables strategy
to estimate the causal eﬀect of income on children’s math and reading achievement. Our identiﬁcation derives from the large, non-linear changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
over the last two decades. The largest of these changes increased family income by as much
as 20%, or approximately $2,100, between 1993 and 1997. Using a panel of roughly 4,500 children matched to their mothers from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth datasets allows us
to address problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity, endogenous transitory income
shocks, and measurement error in income. Our baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase
in income raises combined math and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation in the
short-run. Test gains are larger for children from disadvantaged families and are robust to a
variety of alternative speciﬁcations.
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Introduction

In 2008, 13.2 million children in the U.S. under the age of 18, or more than one in six children, were
living in poverty (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). Given such a high poverty rate, the consequences
of growing up poor on child well-being and future success has emerged as an important research
topic. Of particular interest is whether income support programs like the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) can improve child development. However, the extent to which income maintenance
programs, and family income more generally, impact children is not easily estimated.
The major challenge faced by researchers attempting to estimate the causal eﬀect of family
income on children’s outcomes has been the endogeneity of income. Children growing up in poor
families are likely to have adverse home environments or face other challenges which would continue
to aﬀect their development even if family income were to increase substantially. Furthermore, yearto-year changes in family circumstances like parental job loss or promotion, illness, or moving
to a new neighborhood may aﬀect both family income as well as family dynamics and parenting
behavior. The latter poses a problem for traditional empirical studies that fail to separately identify
the eﬀects caused by changes in income from the eﬀects of changes in other unmeasured family
circumstances. These concerns have long prevented the literature from reaching a consensus on
whether family income has a causal eﬀect on child development (see Duncan and Brooks-Gunn
(1997), Haveman and Wolfe (1995), Mayer (1997)).
Since the mid-1990s, one of the largest federal anti-poverty programs in the U.S. has been the
EITC, which provides cash assistance to low-income families and individuals who have earnings
from work.1 Low income families with two or more children can receive a credit of up to 40% of
their income in recent years (up to $4,824 in 2008), while families with one child can receive a credit
of up to 34%. In 2007, the EITC provided $48.7 billion in income beneﬁts to 25 million families
and individuals, lifting more children out of poverty than any other government program (Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). It is natural to ask what eﬀect the EITC and other income
maintenance programs have on disadvantaged children.
Expansions of the EITC in the late 1980s and 1990s provide an exogenous source of income
variation for American families that we use to identify the eﬀects of family income on child achievement. Figure 1 shows that EITC expansions over this period were sizeable and primarily beneﬁtted
low to middle income families. Not only did the maximum beneﬁt amount increase substantially,
1

See Hotz and Scholz (2003) and Eissa and Hoynes (2005) for detailed descriptions of the EITC program and a
summary of related research.
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but the range of family income which qualiﬁed families for EITC beneﬁts also expanded. The ﬁgure
shows that two-child families with pre-tax incomes ranging from $12,000-16,000 would have seen
their EITC payments increase by as much as $900 from 1987 to 1993 and another $2,100 between
1993 and 1997.2 The maximum subsidy rate for low income families with two children doubled from
19.5% to 40% of earned income over the latter period. Expansions for single-child families were
quite similar to those for two-child families prior to 1993; however, they have been more modest
since.
We estimate the impact of changes in family income (resulting from the EITC expansions) on
child cognitive achievement. Our estimation strategy is based on the fact that low to middle income
families beneﬁtted substantially from expansions of the EITC in the late-1980s and mid-1990s while
higher income families did not. To the extent that income aﬀects child achievement, we should
observe relative improvements in the test scores of children from families beneﬁtting the most from
the EITC expansions.
Our analysis uses panel data on almost 4,500 children matched to their mothers in the Children
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). These data contain a rich set of income
and demographic measures. More importantly, these data have up to ﬁve repeated measures of
cognitive test scores per child taken every other year, which allows us to account for unobserved
child ﬁxed eﬀects.
Our instrumental variables estimates suggest that current income has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on a
child’s math and reading achievement — a $1,000 increase in family income raises math and reading
test scores by about 6% of a standard deviation. The estimated eﬀects are larger for children from
more disadvantaged backgrounds, for younger children, and for boys. Simple dynamic models
suggest that contemporaneous income has the largest eﬀect on achievement, with small eﬀects
from past income.
While modest, our instrumental variables estimates are larger than cross-section ordinary least
squares (OLS) or standard ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) estimates. Several explanations may account for this
diﬀerence. One is that income is noisily measured, so that OLS and FE estimates suﬀer from
attenuation bias. It is also possible that income matters more for the most disadvantaged and that
our instrument largely reﬂects the eﬀect of income for these families. Perhaps the most interesting
2

All dollar amounts are reported in year 2000 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers
(CPI-U) to adjust for inﬂation. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 began to adjust maximum credit amounts and phasein/phase-out regions for cost-of-living changes in years that did not speciﬁcally legislate changes in the EITC schedule.
However, the federal tax adjustment is based on the CPI from the previous year (rather than the current year as
used in our calculations). This explains why the reported maximum credit in our ﬁgures is about $30 less in 1989
than it was in 1987.
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explanation is that expectations about future income play an important role in determining child
outcomes. In this case, permanent changes in family income should have larger eﬀects on children
than do temporary changes. To the extent that changes in the EITC are expected to last longer
than most idiosyncratic shocks to family income, our instrumental variables estimates should be
greater than traditional OLS and ﬁxed eﬀect estimates (see Dahl and Lochner (2005)).
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we give a brief literature review. Section 3
discusses our strategy for estimating the eﬀect of family income on child outcomes. We then discuss
the data and document the large changes in the EITC in Section 4. Section 5 presents estimates of
the eﬀect of income on math and reading test scores, including results from a variety of alternative
speciﬁcations and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.

2

Previous Research

A growing empirical literature questions how poverty aﬀects a child’s well-being and whether income
support programs can improve a child’s life chances. However, evidence on the extent to which
family income aﬀects child development is mixed. Previous studies diﬀer in data, methods, and
ﬁndings, as discussed in the collection of studies in Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997) or the surveys
in Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Mayer (1997).
Researchers have provided several explanations for why family income might aﬀect child development. First, poverty is associated with increased levels of parental stress, depression, and poor
health — conditions which might adversely aﬀect parents’ ability to nurture their children (see,
e.g., McLoyd 1990). For example, in 1998, 27% of kindergartners living in poverty had a parent
at risk for depression, compared to 14% for other kindergartners (Child Trends and Center for
Child Health Research, 2004). Low income parents also report a higher level of frustration and
aggravation with their children, and these children are more likely to have poor verbal development
and exhibit higher levels of distractability and hostility in the classroom (Parker et. al, 1999).
Two recent working papers examine income transfer programs in Canada and the U.S. and ﬁnd
evidence that income transfers improve a family’s emotional well-being. Milligan and Stabile (2009)
ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on self-reported child and maternal mental health, and Evans and
Garthwaite (2010) ﬁnd lower levels of self-reported maternal stress and a drop in the probability of
risky levels of biomarkers associated with stress. Extra family income might also matter if parents
use the money for child-centered goods like books, for quality daycare or preschool programs, for
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better dependent health care, or to move to a better neighborhood.3
Until very recently, empirical studies linking poverty and income to child outcomes have done
little to eliminate biases caused by the omission of unobserved family and child characteristics. Most
studies employ regressions of an outcome variable (such as scholastic achievement) on some measure
of family income and a set of observable family, child, and neighborhood characteristics. While these
studies reveal the correlations between income and child outcomes, they do not necessarily estimate
a causal relationship as Mayer (1997), Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997), and others have pointed
out. Children living in poor families may have a worse home environment or other characteristics
that the researcher does not observe. These omitted variables may be part of the reason for
substandard achievement and may continue to aﬀect children’s development even if family income
were to rise.
Blau (1999), Duncan, et. al (1998), and Levy and Duncan (1999) use ﬁxed eﬀects estimation
strategies to eliminate biases caused by permanent family or child characteristics. All three studies
use diﬀerences in family income levels across siblings to remove ﬁxed family factors when estimating
the impacts of income on child outcomes. Using PSID data, both Duncan, et. al (1998) and Levy and
Duncan (1999) ﬁnd that family income at early ages is more important for determining educational
attainment whether they control for ﬁxed family eﬀects or not. Using data from the Children
of the NLSY, Blau (1999) reaches somewhat diﬀerent conclusions. He estimates larger eﬀects of
“permanent income” when he controls for “grandparent ﬁxed eﬀects” (i.e. comparing outcomes for
the children of sisters) than when he does not. However, he ﬁnds smaller and insigniﬁcant eﬀects of
current family income on achievement and behavioral outcomes when he uses ﬁxed eﬀect strategies
(regardless of whether he uses comparisons of cousins, siblings, or repeated observations for the
same individual) rather than OLS. While these studies represent a signiﬁcant step forward, they
do not control for endogenous transitory shocks (e.g. parental job loss or promotion, family illness,
residential moves) and likely suﬀer from severe attenuation bias, since growth in income is typically
noisily measured.
A few recent studies attempt to address these problems in a variety of ways. Two quasiexperimental studies estimate the impacts of government income transfers on children. Duncan,
Morris and Rodrigues (2007) combine data from ten welfare and anti-poverty experiments in an
attempt to identify the eﬀect of family income separately from employment and welfare eﬀects
3

Children in poor families spend less time reading with their parents, are less likely to receive adequate health
care and nutrition, and attend underfunded public schools, all of which are negatively associated with academic
performance (Child Trends and Center for Child Health Research, 2004).
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induced by the programs. Milligan and Stabile (2009) estimate the impacts of changes in child
tax beneﬁts in Canada on child outcomes using variation in beneﬁt changes by province and the
number of children in the household. These studies ﬁnd modest to large eﬀects of family income
on child educational and achievement outcomes that are largely consistent with our estimates. A
second set of studies (Løken 2010, Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall 2010) estimates the impact of
family income on the educational attainment and IQ of Norwegian children using regional variation
in the economic boom following the discovery of oil as an instrument for income. Generalizing
the speciﬁcation of Løken (2010), Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall (2010) estimate that income has
sizeable impacts on education and IQ among children from low-income families; however, those
eﬀects decline sharply among higher income families.4
The conclusions reached by recent studies suggest that unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous income shocks are important concerns. Furthermore, they suggest that income eﬀects may
be greatest among economically disadvantaged families. In the following section, we outline an
instrumental variables strategy which eliminates omitted variable biases due to both permanent
and temporary shocks correlated with family income and alleviates bias due to measurement error
in income. Given our source of exogenous income variation (changes in the EITC), our strategy
identiﬁes the eﬀects of family income on achievement for children from lower-income families.
Using our instrumental variables approach, we explore a few simple dynamic speciﬁcations
of child achievement that allow for lasting eﬀects of family income on children. Few previous
studies explore dynamic relationships between family income and child achievement. Those that
do tend to focus on the relative importance of family income received at diﬀerent child ages and
are subject to the same concerns about unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous family income
shocks as described above. Most of these studies ﬁnd that income received when a child is young
has stronger lasting impacts than does income received during later childhood or adolescence (see
Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997 and Duncan et al. 1998).5
4

Other evidence from recent studies on the eﬀects of parental education and job displacement indirectly suggests
that family income may have important eﬀects on children (Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2005, Oreopoulos, Page
and Stevens 2006, 2008).
5
Related studies estimate dynamic models of child development as a function of family and school inputs. For
example, Todd and Wolpin (2007) estimate a dynamic model of both family and school inputs into child development.
Their estimates imply strong lasting eﬀects of family inputs (e.g. number of books in the home) but relatively weak
eﬀects of measured school inputs (e.g. teacher salary).
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3

Methodology

3.1

Modeling Child Achievement

Child achievement potentially depends on a child’s ability, as well as other past and present child
inputs (e.g. parental time, books, neighborhoods, schools, and home environments). Since family
income aﬀects decisions about investment in children, as well as parental stress and whether the
general home environment is conducive to development, current and lagged family income have the
potential to aﬀect child outcomes at any particular age. In this section, we model how changes in
family income (through such policies as the EITC) aﬀect child achievement.
Let xi reﬂect observable permanent characteristics and µi reﬂect unobserved permanent ‘ability’
for child i (i.e., a child ﬁxed eﬀect). These measures can also incorporate unobserved long-run
diﬀerences across families. Let wia reﬂect time-varying characteristics and Iia total family income
(net of any taxes and transfers, including EITC payments) for child i at age a. Finally, let εia
denote any time-varying unobserved shocks to the child or family. Using this notation, a general
model for child outcome yia as a function of the child’s family characteristics and income history is
yia = fa (xi , wi0 , ..., wia , Ii0 , ..., Iia , µi , εia ). For empirical purposes, it is useful to simplify the child
outcome equation as follows:
′
yia = x′i αa + wia
β + Iia δ0 + Ii,a−1 δ1 + ... + Ii,a−L δL + µi + εia ,

(1)

assuming that the eﬀects of income on child achievement last for L years.6
To focus on the role of income, equation (1) abstracts from the eﬀects of past time-varying
characteristics; however, these can easily be incorporated in the same way as past income. Equation
(1) also abstracts from the possibility that income has diﬀerent eﬀects at diﬀerent ages (i.e. eﬀects
depend only on the time elapsed between when income is earned and when child achievement is
measured) or at diﬀerent points in the income distribution (i.e. linearity in income is assumed).
We explore these issues empirically below.
The speciﬁcation in equation (1) allows for diﬀerent eﬀects of permanent characteristics at all
ages (i.e. αa ). In our empirical analysis, we allow xi characteristics (e.g. race, gender, and age of the
child) to aﬀect both the level and growth of child achievement. Taking ﬁrst-diﬀerences of equation
(1) to eliminate the unobserved ﬁxed eﬀect µi yields:
′
∆yia = x′i α + ∆wia
β + ∆Iia δ0 + ∆Ii,a−1 δ1 + ... + ∆Ii,a−L δL + ∆εia ,

(2)

6
One commonly used achievement model assumes that current achievement depends on current income and lagged
achievement (e.g. yia = x′i αa + wia β + Iia δ + yi,a−1 ρ + µi + εia ). Recursively substituting in for lagged values of
achievement on the right hand side yields a speciﬁcation very similar to equation (1) in which all lagged income
measures and other time varying characteristics would also be included.
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where α ≡ αa − αa−1 is the eﬀect of xi on achievement growth (assumed to be age invariant).
A common achievement speciﬁcation in the child development literature assumes that there are
only contemporaneous eﬀects of family income on children, ignoring any long-run eﬀects. That is,
L = 0 in equations (1) and (2), which yields the following estimating equation in ﬁrst-diﬀerences:
′
∆yia = x′i α + ∆wia
β + ∆Iia δ0 + ∆εia .

(3)

This ‘contemporaneous eﬀects’ model serves as our baseline and receives empirical support in our
analysis. It is diﬃcult empirically to estimate more general models which allow prior income in
every year since birth to aﬀect child outcomes. However, we also estimate speciﬁcations which
allow one and two year lags.

3.2

Using Changes in the EITC to Estimate the Eﬀects of Income

The primary concern with least squares estimation of the models above is the possibility that
changes in unobserved factors aﬀecting child development (i.e. ∆εia ) are correlated with changes
in family income. More generally, ∆εia may be correlated with the entire history of income levels
given the strong intertemporal correlation of income and its tendency for regression to the mean.
To address this problem, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) estimation strategy that takes
advantage of major changes in the EITC to estimate the eﬀects of income on children. To simplify
the discussion, we focus on the ‘contemporaneous eﬀects’ model of equation (3); however, we take
a similar approach in estimating the more general model implied by equation (2), which allows for
lasting eﬀects of income on children. (See the Appendix.)
We use total net family income (inclusive of EITC payments and net of other federal and state
taxes and transfers) as our measure of total family income, Iia . EITC income, χsaia (Pia ), is a
function of pre-tax income, Pia , for the year when child i is age a. We also take into account
other taxes, τasia (Pia ). While the EITC and tax schedules do not generally vary with the child’s
age in any given year, they do sometimes change over time as the child ages. We exploit this time
variation, referencing diﬀerent years by age of the child, a. The superscript sia on the EITC and
tax functions denotes which schedule a child’s family is on; the EITC schedules only diﬀer based
the number of children in the household, while the more general tax function depends on a broader
set of family characteristics.7 Therefore, total net family income is given by
Iia = Pia + χsaia (Pia ) − τasia (Pia ).
7

Our empirical analysis takes many additional income and tax distinctions into account; we ignore them here for
expositional purposes. See the Appendix.
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Central to our analysis is the variation in EITC schedules over time and the way in which EITC
expansions have diﬀerentially augmented the incomes of diﬀerent families.
Our IV estimation strategy builds on that of Gruber and Saez (2002) by assuming that changes
in the EITC structure are independent of idiosyncratic family circumstances.8 As an instrument
for ∆Iia in estimating equation (3), we use
s

s

i,a−1
i,a−1
∆χIV
(Ê[Pi,a |Pi,a−1 ]) − χa−1
(Pi,a−1 ),
a (Pi,a−1 ) ≡ χa

where Ê[Pi,a |Pi,a−1 ] is an estimate of pre-tax income given lagged pre-tax income. In practice, we
regress pre-tax income on an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income and a ﬁfth-order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income when calculating Ê[Pi,a |Pi,a−1 ]. This eﬀectively yields predicted
changes in EITC income as a function of lagged pre-tax income, taking into account the fact that
income evolves over time in a predictable way and that the EITC schedule changes in some years.9
By holding ﬁxed the type of EITC schedule (1 vs. 2+ children) si,a−1 in generating our instrument,
we only exploit variation in predicted EITC income due to government changes in EITC schedules
over time and not due to changes in family structure.
Of course, simply estimating equation (3) using ∆χIV
a as an instrument is likely to yield biased
estimates for δ0 , since changes in families’ simulated EITC payments are a function of age a−1 pretax family income (Pi,a−1 ), which is likely to be correlated with the subsequent change in income
due to such factors as measurement error, regression to the mean, and serially correlated income
shocks. Therefore, based on the insight of Gruber and Saez (2002), we augment the outcome
equation with a ﬂexible function of Pi,a−1 when instrumenting. Letting Φ(Pi,a−1 ) reﬂect a ﬂexible
function of lagged pre-tax income, we estimate
′
∆yia = x′i α + ∆wia
β + ∆Iia δ0 + Φ(Pi,a−1 ) + ηia

(4)

using ∆χIV
as an instrument for ∆Iia . Empirically, we employ the same functional form for
a
Φ(Pi,a−1 ) as we use in estimating Ê[Pi,a |Pi,a−1 ]: we include an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax
income and a ﬁfth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. This ensures that the variation
8

This strategy is loosely related to Feldstein (1995) and Currie and Gruber (1996), who use the eﬀects of policy
changes on economy-wide aggregates rather than the distributional consequences of policy changes to identify their
parameters of interest. See Moﬃtt and Wilhelm (2000) for a general discussion of the simulated IV methodology and
its application.
si,a−1
s
9
(Pi,a−1 ). In practice, age a
The ideal (i.e. most eﬃcient) instrument would be E[χai,a−1 (Pi,a )|Pi,a−1 ] − χa−1
EITC income is diﬃcult to predict based on lagged income due to non-linearity and discontinuities in the EITC
schedule. An intuitive approach would simply use lagged pre-tax income Pi,a−1 in place of Ê[Pi,a |Pi,a−1 ] in creating
our instrument. This strategy (when incorporating the control function as discussed below) yields consistent but
much less precise estimates compared to the approach taken here.
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in our instrument used to identify δ0 comes from changes in the EITC schedule and not from
the level of lagged pre-tax income. Intuitively, this strategy estimates the extent to which the
diﬀerential income boosts associated with the EITC expansions (as determined by past income
levels) are met with increases in child achievement. If income has a positive eﬀect on achievement,
we should observe greater increases in test scores among children from low-income families relative
to high-income families when the EITC expands.10
One can think of the polynomial Φ(Pi,a−1 ) in equation (4) as a control function. It is, therefore,
important that Φ(·) be ﬂexible enough to capture the true expected relationship between child
development shocks and lagged pre-tax income — we use a very ﬂexible polynomial in lagged pretax income. In the most general case, the control function should equal E[∆εia |Pi,a−1 , xi , ∆wia ].
As such, if the evolution of income over time diﬀers systematically with xi or ∆wia or if the
relationship between ∆εia and pre-tax income depends on xi or ∆wia , then the control function
should be generalized to account for these relationships. Recognizing this possibility, we consider
alternative speciﬁcations using a more general control function that interacts Φ(Pi,a−1 ) with all xi
and ∆wia regressors.11
Our approach relies on one fundamental assumption: the relationship between child development shocks and lagged pre-tax income must be stable over time. In using a time invariant control
function Φ(·), our baseline analysis implicitly assumes that the relationship between ∆εia and pretax income does not vary with time over our sample period. To relax this assumption, we explore
additional speciﬁcations that allow the control function to evolve smoothly over time or to vary
state by state in response to changes in state welfare or school accountability policies. However, it
is not possible to allow the control function to vary freely over time, since this would eliminate any
independent variation in our instrument ∆χIV
a (Pi,a−1 ).
With a fully ﬂexible (time invariant) control function, all identiﬁcation comes from diﬀerential
changes in the EITC schedule over time. Our strategy would break down if the EITC schedule
did not change during our sample period, since there would be no independent variation in our
instrument given the control function Φ(Pi,a−1 ). In fact, our approach requires at least three periods
of data, since we need at least two diﬀerent changes in the EITC schedule over time given a ﬂexible
10

Figure 1b makes clear that the largest changes in our instrument occur for low to moderate income families. If
Ê[Pi,a |Pi,a−1 ] = Pi,a−1 , then the value of the instrument over time (as a function of pre-tax income) would be as
illustrated in Figure 1b. However, for very low earnings families, Ê[Pi,a |Pi,a−1 ] > Pi,a−1 since their earned income
is predicted to rise. The time invariant control function accounts for the fact that the value of the instrument varies
by income even when the EITC schedule does not change. As discussed below, our approach requires that the EITC
schedule itself must change over time to identify the eﬀect of income on child achievement.
11
The Appendix provides a more detailed discussion of these issues. See Heckman and Robb (1985) for a general
treatment of control functions. Linear spline functions yield similar results to those presented in the paper.
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control function. To better understand identiﬁcation, suppose that income did not change at all
over time. In this case, any changes in after-tax income would be driven solely by changes in the
EITC schedule. The validity of our research design, therefore, hinges on controlling ﬂexibly for
pre-tax income with the control function. The fact that we use lagged pre-tax income is second
order.
Two minor practical issues arise in our analysis. First, the vast majority of EITC recipients
receive their credit after ﬁling their taxes the following year. Therefore, we link test scores (typically
measured sometime between March and December in our data) with income earned in the previous
calendar year (reported during the same survey as test scores are recorded), referring to them as
‘contemporaneous’. Second, we only observe child achievement scores every other year as we discuss
further below. Thus, we use two-year diﬀerences rather than one-year diﬀerences in our analysis.
The Appendix brieﬂy describes how this aﬀects the estimating equations above.

4

Data

We use data from the Children of the NLSY and the main NLSY sample of mothers. These data
are ideal for studying the eﬀects of family income on children for several reasons. First, we can link
children to their mothers, and second, we can follow families over time. Third, the NLSY contains
repeated measures of various child outcomes and comprehensive measures of family income. Finally,
the NLSY oversamples minority families, which provides a larger sample of families eligible for the
EITC. We exclude children from the oversamples of poor white families and military families.
The NLSY collects a rich set of variables for both children and mothers repeatedly over time,
allowing us to estimate models with child ﬁxed eﬀects. For children, biennial measures of family
background and cognitive achievement are available from 1986 to 2000. Detailed longitudinal
demographic, educational, and labor market information for the mothers is available annually from
1979 through 1994 and biennially thereafter. Equally important, family income measures (for the
previous calendar year) are available in all survey years for the mothers up to 1994 and biennially
thereafter. The survey reports many components of family income, which we aggregate into three
categories of pre-tax/EITC income: earned income, unearned income, and non-taxable income.
See the Online Appendix for a description of these income categories and how we impute missing
observations.
While the NLSY contains a broad array of income questions, it does not ask an individual how
much they received in EITC payments or paid in taxes. Both the IRS (2002) and Scholz (1994)
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estimate that roughly 80 to 87 percent of eligible households receive the credit. We implicitly assume
full take-up and impute each family’s state and federal EITC payment and tax burden using the
TAXSIM program (version 9) maintained by Daniel Feenberg and the NBER (see Feenberg and
Coutts, 1993 and http://www.nber.org/taxsim).
In our analysis, we focus on measures of scholastic achievement in math and reading based on
standardized scores on Peabody Individual Achievement Tests (PIAT). The assessments measure
ability in mathematics, oral reading and word recognition ability (reading recognition), and the
ability to derive meaning from printed words (reading comprehension). From 1986 to 2000, the
tests were administered biennially to children ages ﬁve and older; although, 92% of our estimation
sample is between the ages of 8 and 14. Children took each individual test at most ﬁve times due
to the age restrictions. See the Online Appendix for details.
To make the PIAT test scores more easily interpretable, we create normalized test scores with a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one based on the random sample of test takers (i.e. excluding the poor, military, and minority oversamples). We also create a combined math-reading score,
which takes the average of our normalized math and reading scores. This is then re-normalized
to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one in the random sample. Our full sample
that includes oversamples of blacks and hispanics has negative average normalized test scores, since
children in the oversamples are more disadvantaged on average.
We restrict our main sample to children observed in at least two consecutive (even-numbered)
survey years between 1988 and 2000 with valid PIAT scores, family background characteristics,
and family income measures, since our primary analysis estimates models with child ﬁxed eﬀects.12
Because changes in family income are likely to mean something very diﬀerent when there is a
change of marital status relative to when there is not, we also limit our sample to children whose
mothers did not change marital status during two-year intervals when test scores are measured. Our
main sample includes 4,412 interviewed children born to 2,401 interviewed mothers, with children
observed 2.2 times on average. Table 1 provides information on family income and EITC eligibility
over time for this main sample. The table reveals that median after-tax family income rose in
real terms from $23,463 reported in 1988 to $38,390 reported in 2000. The time trend in family
income, which outpaced inﬂation, is largely attributable to the aging of mothers in the sample. The
12

We exclude the 1986 survey year and survey years 2002 onward to focus our analysis on changes in the EITC,
rather than the large changes in the tax code associated with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the two ‘Bush’ tax
cuts in 2001 and 2003. To focus on EITC changes, we also exclude observations with family income levels above
$100,000; although, including these observations has negligible eﬀects. To minimize the inﬂuence of outliers and
obvious measurement error, we also trim observations with very large changes in income or large and unusual changes
in reported welfare income. See the Online Appendix for details.
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relevance of changes in the EITC schedule over time is also evident in Table 1. Roughly one-third
of children live in families which qualify for the EITC, a high rate that is partly due to the NLSY
oversampling of minorities. The largest EITC expansion is reﬂected in the sizeable increase in
EITC eligibility and payment amounts for 2+ child families between 1994 and 1996.
Table A1 in the Appendix describes sample characteristics based on EITC eligibility. Panel A
lists variables for the child that are included as controls in our baseline ‘diﬀerence’ speciﬁcations:
child gender, age, number of siblings, and race. Panel B includes additional variables used as
controls in our OLS ‘levels’ regressions and a robustness speciﬁcation. These include mother’s
characteristics like age, completed education, AFQT score, and whether she lived with both natural
parents at age 14. It also includes the mother’s marital status in the previous year (corresponding
to the year income is measured), household composition variables, spouse’s age, and education
measures of the mother’s parents and spouse.
Column (i) provides summary statistics for our full sample. The average age of the children
in our sample is 11 and most children have at least one sibling. Over half the sample is black
or hispanic due to the oversampling of minorities. The average age of mothers is 33 years old,
although the youngest mother with a child in our sample is 25. Columns (ii) and (iii) in Table
A1 break down the summary statistics based on EITC eligibility, while column (iv) reports the
diﬀerence between eligible and ineligible families. Children from EITC eligible families (relative
to those that are ineligible) are more likely to be minorities and have mothers with less education
and lower AFQT scores. Their parents are also less likely to be married. These diﬀerences suggest
that some children will be more directly aﬀected by changes in the generosity of the EITC (e.g.
black children with unmarried, low educated mothers versus white children with married, highly
educated mothers).

5

The Eﬀect of Income on Cognitive Achievement

In this section, we discuss the estimated impact of family income on children’s math and reading
achievement. We ﬁrst report standard OLS and diﬀerenced estimates of outcome equations (1)
and (2) under diﬀerent assumptions about the dynamic eﬀects of income. We also brieﬂy discuss
estimates for a few additional speciﬁcations previously employed in the literature. We then turn
to our IV estimation strategy, which accounts for measurement error, permanent unobserved heterogeneity, and temporary unobserved shocks. We explore whether income changes have lasting
eﬀects on child achievement, whether the eﬀects vary across diﬀerent demographic groups, and
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whether income diﬀerentially aﬀects younger versus older children. To establish the robustness
of our ﬁndings, we examine a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations, including regressions which account for time-varying state policies, more general control functions, and maternal labor market
participation.

5.1

OLS and Diﬀerenced Estimates

We begin by presenting OLS and diﬀerenced estimates of the eﬀects of family income on our
combined math-reading measure of cognitive achievement. As a reminder, the diﬀerenced estimates
are based on two-year diﬀerences, since children are only administered the PIAT tests every other
year. Compared to most studies, we estimate more general models of child achievement, exploring
whether income has lasting eﬀects on children.
Table 2 reports estimates of equations (1) and (2) under diﬀerent assumptions about the persistence of income eﬀects. In the levels models we regress child achievement on total income and
include all the variables reported in Table A1 as controls. The speciﬁcation we estimate in diﬀerences is slightly more general, since we allow achievement growth to vary by the child characteristics
listed in panel A of Table A1. Column (i) assumes the ‘contemporaneous eﬀects’ model used by
many previous studies. Estimated in levels, we ﬁnd that a $1,000 increase in family income raises
math-reading test scores by 0.005 standard deviations. Estimated in diﬀerences, the eﬀect is less
than one-fourth as large and no longer signiﬁcant. These estimates are similar to corresponding
estimates in Blau (1999).
There are two reasons to expect a discrepancy between diﬀerence (or ﬁxed eﬀects) and crosssectional OLS estimates. First, measurement error is greater for income measured in diﬀerences
than in levels, so attenuation bias will be greater for diﬀerence estimators. Second, a correlation
between unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects (µi ) and family income will bias cross-sectional OLS estimates.
The ﬁrst bias is greater for diﬀerence estimates while the second only aﬀects cross-sectional OLS,
so there is no a priori reason to prefer one type of estimator over the other. More importantly,
both approaches suﬀer from additional bias if unobserved transitory shocks to families and children
are correlated with family income.
Columns (ii)-(iv) estimate more general models that allow for the possibility that income eﬀects
persist for up to two years into the future. Column (iii) reveals the diﬃculty in identifying the
persistence of income eﬀects beyond one year due to the high degree of collinearity in earnings
over time. To improve precision but still allow for a diﬀerence between contemporaneous and past
income, column (iv) imposes δ1 = δ2 but allows for a separate eﬀect of contemporaneous income,
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δ0 . The levels speciﬁcations in Panel A suggest that income eﬀects are quite small and may last for
a few years, while diﬀerence estimates in Panel B suggest even smaller eﬀects for current and lagged
income. For both panels, we also report the implied medium-term eﬀects of increasing income by
$1,000 each year for up to three years. This is simply the sum of the estimated eﬀects of current
and lagged income. These are quite modest and similar across columns (ii)-(iv), and suggest that
the coeﬃcient in column (i) understates the medium-run eﬀect of a sustained increase in income.
An alternative speciﬁcation often seen in the literature regresses child achievement on a longrun average of family income (generally averaging over all available income measures from the
past, present, and future). This speciﬁcation is economically motivated by the standard lifecycle
or permanent income model, which assumes family investments in children depend on lifetime
or ‘permanent’ income rather than income in any particular period. Implicit is the assumption
that families can borrow and save in order to smooth their consumption and child investments
over time. A separate statistical argument can also be made for regressing child achievement on
average income rather than income received in any particular period. Because income is measured
with error, standard OLS level and diﬀerenced estimators will tend to be biased towards zero, and
averaging may alleviate this problem. In practice, previous studies tend to estimate larger eﬀects of
average income than of current income (e.g. Blau 1999). We ﬁnd the same pattern: the relationship
between long-run average income and test scores is 70% larger compared to the relationship between
current income and achievement. One concern with using average long-run family income is the
diﬃculty in accounting for unobserved long-run heterogeneity using ﬁxed eﬀects strategies. Since
average family income is likely to be more strongly correlated with unobserved family characteristics
than is income for any particular period, estimates using long-run averages of family income may
be subject to greater omitted variable bias.

5.2

IV Estimates

We now turn to our IV approach to estimate the eﬀects of family income on child achievement. We
begin with our simple ‘contemporaneous eﬀects’ model in diﬀerences (equation 3) using simulated
changes in the EITC (based on lagged income) as instruments for changes in actual after-tax/EITC
total family income. As a practical matter, identiﬁcation comes primarily from the substantial
expansion of the EITC schedule between 1993 and 1995; however, other smaller changes in the EITC
schedule also aid in identiﬁcation. The approach reveals whether achievement scores systematically
increased more for families who were predicted to receive a greater boost in EITC payments during
years when the schedule expanded.
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Our approach requires inclusion of a ﬂexible function of lagged pre-tax income as detailed in
equation (4). We explored diﬀerent ordered polynomials and found the estimates to be very similar
for orders four and above if we also include an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income. To
be conservative, we use a ﬁfth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income and an indicator for
positive lagged pre-tax income as our baseline ‘control function’. Our baseline speciﬁcation allows
for diﬀerential growth in achievement based on a child’s gender, age, number of siblings, and
race. Below, we show that the results are similar for speciﬁcations with additional controls (i.e.
other factors aﬀecting growth in test scores) and with more general control functions that interact
included regressors with the polynomial in income.
Table 3 reports baseline IV estimates for our combined math-reading achievement measure, as
well as each of the individual PIAT subject test measures. The results in column (i) imply that a
$1,000 increase in family income raises math-reading achievement by 6% of a standard deviation,
a modest eﬀect, but much larger than the comparable OLS estimates in column (i) of Table 2.13
To place this estimate in perspective, in the OLS levels speciﬁcation, having a mother who is
a high school graduate (versus a high school dropout) is associated with an increase of 17% of a
standard deviation in achievement. Looking at columns (ii) – (iv) in Table 3, the estimated eﬀects of
income are noticeably lower for reading recognition, while the estimated eﬀects of income on reading
comprehension and math are similar to the eﬀects for our combined math-reading measure.
This table also reports the coeﬃcient on our instrument in the ﬁrst stage regression of changes
in total family income on changes in predicted EITC receipt. It is slightly larger than one, but not
signiﬁcantly so. In general, this coeﬃcient may deviate from one due to labor supply responses to
the EITC expansions or due to measurement error in income. As we discuss later in the paper, we
ﬁnd some evidence of a modest eﬀect operating through labor supply.
The key assumption in our analysis is that the relationship between child achievement growth
and lagged pre-tax income should be relatively stable over time if the EITC schedule is not changing.
Identiﬁcation relies on linking changes in the income – achievement relationship with changes in
the EITC schedule over time. Of particular concern are systematic economic or policy changes that
would improve the test scores of children from lower-income families at the same time the EITC
expanded (most notably from 1993 to 1995). In this case, our IV estimators would mistakenly
13

Since we use two-year diﬀerences in income and child outcomes, these estimates reﬂect the eﬀects of increasing
annual income by $1,000 for up to two years. As we show below with dynamic achievement speciﬁcations, these
estimates largely identify the impact of increasing income in the current year by $1,000, since earlier increases in
income appear to have small lasting eﬀects. The estimates could also be inﬂated by about 15-20% to account for the
fact that EITC take-up rates are estimated to range from 80 to 87% (IRS 2002, Scholz 1994).
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attribute the achievement gains of disadvantaged children to the increased income their families
received from expansions of the EITC. We explore speciﬁcations in Table 4 that take into account
national time trends and changes in state-level school accountability and welfare policies. To
conserve space, we only report estimates for our combined math-reading achievement measure.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation in Table 4 includes year dummies in our baseline speciﬁcation. This allows
average test scores to vary freely from year to year, and forces identiﬁcation of our IV estimate
to come entirely from diﬀerences in predicted EITC changes across individuals (by lagged pre-tax
income) between any two years.14 This yields a similar point estimate (signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level)
to that of Table 3, but the standard error increases by two-thirds. Speciﬁcations B and C in the
table allow for a linear time trend in test score growth; speciﬁcation C also interacts the time trend
with the control function Φ(Pi,a−1 ) (i.e. the polynomial in lagged pre-tax income and an indicator
for positive lagged pre-tax income). These speciﬁcations yield larger (and less precise) estimates
when compared with our baseline estimate in Table 3. By interacting the time trend with the
control function, we address the concern that the relationship between child outcomes and pre-tax
income is changing over time.
The next two speciﬁcations in Table 4 address changes in state policies that might directly aﬀect
the relationship between child outcomes and family income or characteristics: school accountability
policies and welfare regulations. A few states began to introduce student testing/accountability
measures and welfare reforms in the early 1990s, which some studies have linked to improvements in
state test scores (e.g. Hanushek and Raymond (2005) and Miller and Zhang (2008)).15 To account
for these reforms, we add an annual indicator for whether the child’s state has a ‘consequential’
accountability policy (i.e. required testing with consequences for school performance) to our baseline speciﬁcation. The next speciﬁcation examines whether accounting for welfare reforms taking
place in the 1990s (associated with statewide AFDC waivers and TANF) aﬀects our results. This
speciﬁcation includes an annual indicator equal to one if a state has any of the following: (a) time
limits on welfare receipt, (b) sanctions for violating work requirements, or (c) school requirements
for dependent children. (These speciﬁcations also include interactions between accountability or
welfare reform and the control function.) As Table 4 shows, these additions have little aﬀect on
14

Without time dummies, our estimates are identiﬁed even if everyone experienced the same predicted EITC
change between years as long as the EITC expanded more in some years than others. Our IV speciﬁcations that do
not include time dummies are identiﬁed from changes in average EITC income and test scores over time as well as
diﬀerential changes in EITC income and test scores across individuals between particular time periods.
15
Most states did not introduce school accountability policies or welfare reforms prior to 1996. A number of
states received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) waivers in the early 1990s; however, most states
introduced welfare reforms with the introduction of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program
in 1996. See the Online Appendix for a detailed description of our school accountability and welfare policy measures.
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our estimates. Finally, the last speciﬁcation of Table 4 simultaneously accounts for national time
trends, state-level school accountability, and state-welfare reforms. The results are nearly identical
to our baseline estimates (with larger standard errors). In summary, we ﬁnd no evidence that
time-varying policies or economic changes materially aﬀect the estimated impacts of family income
on child achievement.
In Table 5, we return to dynamic models of child achievement that allow for lasting eﬀects
of family income on children. We report estimates for the combined math-reading achievement
measure analogous to those of Table 2. Due to the limited number of major changes in the EITC
schedule, we only estimate the eﬀects of income lasting up to two years into the future. These
speciﬁcations instrument for lagged income changes, including the appropriate control function,
using a similar approach to that used for the contemporaneous eﬀects model (see the Appendix for
details). Columns (i) and (ii) allow for the possibility that income aﬀects test scores up to one or
two years later. Both speciﬁcations suggest sizeable eﬀects of contemporaneous income and eﬀects
of past income which are smaller. Given the sizeable standard errors when multiple years of income
are included, column (iii) restricts both one- and two-year lagged income to have the same eﬀect
(i.e. δ1 = δ2 ). This speciﬁcation provides more precise estimates, but yields the same conclusion:
contemporaneous income plays an important role in achievement, with smaller eﬀects from past
income.16 The table also reports the implied medium-term eﬀects of a sustained increase in income
for up to three years. These medium-term eﬀects are up to 50% larger than the contemporaneous
eﬀect estimated in Table 3.
We draw two main conclusions from Table 5. First, there are small, but statistically insigniﬁcant,
eﬀects of lagged income on math and reading achievement scores. The medium-term eﬀects suggest
that our baseline estimates in Table 3, if anything, understate the eﬀects of lasting income changes
on child achievement. Second, income appears to have important contemporaneous eﬀects on child
achievement. Moreover, incorporating lasting eﬀects of income does not substantially alter the fact
that income has a sizeable contemporaneous eﬀect. So, while one would certainly like to more
fully determine the dynamic eﬀects of family income on achievement, the simple ‘contemporaneous
eﬀects’ model appears to provide reasonably good estimates of the short-run eﬀects of income. We
focus on this baseline model in the remaining two tables.
Table 6 displays estimates from separate regressions for various population subgroups. Estimates in the table reﬂect the impact of a $1,000 increase in current income on combined math and
16

A number of recent studies estimate similarly strong fade-out eﬀects for the ‘value added’ of individual teachers
on student test scores (e.g. Lockwood, et al. 2007, Jacob, Lefgren and Sims 2008, and Rothstein 2008).
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reading achievement for the reported subgroups. The extent to which diﬀerent subgroups are more
or less aﬀected by changes in the EITC is reﬂected in the ‘Percent in EITC Range’ for each group.
Higher socioeconomic status (SES) groups have a lower probability of being aﬀected by the EITC
and, therefore, a smaller instrumented change in income on average. This is reﬂected in the fact
that the ﬁrst stage estimates for high SES groups typically have standard errors that are twice as
large as those for low SES groups.
Except for the ﬁnal two columns, the table is organized such that estimates for more economically disadvantaged groups are reported at the top while estimates for more advantaged groups are
at the bottom. Achievement for children with low educated mothers increases signiﬁcantly with
income, while achievement for children whose mothers attended at least some college is largely unresponsive to income changes. One should exercise caution in interpreting the latter, however, since
the ﬁrst stage is quite weak for children with more educated mothers. Changes in EITC schedules
do not provide a very good source of income variation for these families. We also estimate strong
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of family income on the achievement of minority children; in
contrast, our estimates for whites are substantially smaller and the ﬁrst stage is imprecise. Point
estimates also suggest that income raises test scores more among children in unmarried households
relative to married households, and more for children whose mother’s AFQT score is below the median compared to above the median; however, these estimates are fairly imprecise. Overall, these
estimates suggest that the eﬀects of family income are greater for more disadvantaged children;
although, the diﬀerence is only statistically signiﬁcant by maternal education.
A number of recent studies (e.g. Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997, Duncan, et al. 1998, Levy
and Duncan 1999) suggest that income at early ages may have greater eﬀects on development than
income received at later ages. In the second to last column of Table 6, we estimate the eﬀects of
income separately for children age 11 or younger versus age 12 or older. These estimates suggest
slightly larger eﬀects of income on achievement for younger children, although the diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant. Unfortunately, we are unable to examine the eﬀects of income at very early
ages, which is when many researchers ﬁnd the largest eﬀects. This is because most children in our
sample (92% of the children) are ages 8 through 14 when they take the PIAT tests.17
In the ﬁnal column of Table 6, we estimate separate models for boys versus girls. The eﬀect of
income for boys is twice as large as that for girls, although the standard errors are large enough
17

One of the PIAT components (reading recognition) initially had problems which invalidated test scores for many
young children. Using the average of the math and reading comprehension tests only, which includes all children
beginning at age ﬁve, we ﬁnd a similar pattern by age: the estimated eﬀect of income is 0.062 (s.e.=0.032) for children
age 11 or younger and 0.033 (s.e.=0.022) for children age 12 or older.
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that the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. This result is similar to that found by Milligan
and Stabile (2009), who ﬁnd that increased child beneﬁt levels in Canada had stronger eﬀects on
the academic performance of boys compared to girls.
Table 7 presents several additional speciﬁcations for the ‘contemporaneous eﬀects’ model (combined math-reading measure) to explore the robustness of our baseline results. Speciﬁcation A includes additional control variables such as the mother’s age and education, her family background,
and her spouse’s characteristics in the diﬀerenced child outcome equation, while speciﬁcation B
removes all control variables (except the control function) from our baseline speciﬁcation. Neither
change in control variables has much impact on the estimated eﬀect of family income. We next
explore a more general control function in speciﬁcation C, interacting all of the baseline control
variables with lagged pre-tax income and the polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. These interactions address the concern that the relationship between child outcomes and lagged income diﬀers
based on the baseline controls. This more general control function does not appreciably change the
estimate.
Our estimates exploit variation in both state and federal EITC schedules when constructing
our instruments. Speciﬁcation D shows that the inclusion of state ﬁxed eﬀects in our speciﬁcations
has little impact on the coeﬃcient of interest. This is true regardless of whether we use the state
EITCs to construct our instruments. Because few states had EITC provisions during our sample
period (5 states by 1996 and 10 states by 1999), the results are very similar when only using federal
changes in EITC schedules to construct our instruments.
Speciﬁcation E in Table 7 uses NLSY-created weights for the initial sample of mothers to weight
observations. These estimates indicate a slightly smaller eﬀect of family income on achievement;
however, the standard error is 12% larger than that of our baseline estimates without weights.18
Table 6 suggests that the eﬀects of income may be stronger for more disadvantaged children.
Under this assumption, some researchers have preferred to measure income in logs rather than
levels. For comparison and as a check on the robustness of our ﬁndings, speciﬁcation F of Table 7
18

Two arguments are often made for using sampling weights. First, they can produce more eﬃcient estimates.
However, this is not generally true in the case of IV estimation and does not appear to be true in our application
based on a comparison of standard errors. A second argument sometimes made for using sampling weights is based on
heterogeneous ‘treatment eﬀects’ and the desire for estimating a population average eﬀect. Since blacks and hispanics
are over-represented in our sample, one might want to use sampling weights to obtain a population ‘average’ eﬀect of
family income on achievement. However, IV does not generally yield a population average eﬀect, except in rare cases
(see, e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil 1998, Imbens and Angrist 1994, Wooldridge 1997). In our context, estimates using
the sampling weights should place a larger weight on the eﬀect for whites vs. minorities. Thus, the slightly smaller
estimate for speciﬁcation D relative to our baseline estimate in Table 3 is consistent with the ﬁnding in Table 6 that
income eﬀects are larger for minorities than for whites.
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uses log total family income as the right-hand side variable rather than income measured in levels.19
This speciﬁcation implies that a 10% increase in family income raises achievement by 6.4% of a
standard deviation. For families with income of $12,000, an extra $1,000 would raise child mathreading scores by 0.053 of a standard deviation, similar to our baseline IV estimate that uses income
measured in levels.
It is natural to question whether the large changes in the EITC generated important labor supply
responses among mothers which may have aﬀected children separately from the direct eﬀects of
income we aim to measure. In principle, an EITC expansion may aﬀect children in three ways. First,
holding earnings constant, it increases family income. Second, it may aﬀect earnings through family
labor supply responses. Both of these aﬀect children through available family resources. Finally,
labor supply responses may directly aﬀect children through parental time spent with children. If
labor supply responses to EITC schedule changes are small, the second and third eﬀects will be
negligible, and our baseline estimates identify only the ﬁrst eﬀect. More generally, we can identify
the eﬀect of total income changes (i.e. the sum of the ﬁrst two eﬀects) by controlling for labor
supply.
Most empirical studies ﬁnd very small negative eﬀects of the EITC expansions on hours worked
by women who were already working. The literature also ﬁnds a positive eﬀect on labor market
participation among single mothers, but small negative eﬀects on married mothers with working
husbands (see Hotz and Scholz 2003 and Eissa and Hoynes 2005). Speciﬁcation G of Table 7
adds changes in maternal labor force participation and hours worked to our baseline speciﬁcations
as additional controls. An increase in the number of hours a mother works has small negative
estimated eﬀects on children, whereas participation changes have statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀects.
Most importantly, accounting for changes in mother’s labor market participation and hours of work
does not aﬀect our main conclusion about the importance of family income.20
Recall that total income increased by $1.27 for a $1 increase in predicted EITC payments in
the ﬁrst stage of the baseline speciﬁcation. The fact that the coeﬃcient is slightly larger than one
(although not signiﬁcantly so) is consistent with a modest bonus impact through increased labor
19
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instrument for ∆ln(Iia ).
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The endogeneity of which mothers work and how much they choose to work is an obvious concern. We attempted
to treat participation as endogenous by using changing parameters of the EITC schedules (e.g. maximum credit
amounts, phase-in and phase-out rates) over time as additional instrumental variables for maternal labor market
participation (an approach similar in spirit to Blundell, et. al 1998, and Eissa and Hoynes 2006). This approach
yields statistically signiﬁcant estimates for family income that are very similar to our baseline estimates; however, it
produces imprecise estimates for maternal labor force participation. Unfortunately, the ﬁrst stage for maternal labor
supply indicates the instruments are weak in our sample.
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supply. Indeed, once labor supply is controlled for in panel G, the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcient drops to
0.90.

5.3

Interpreting IV Estimates

Our IV results indicate modest but encouraging eﬀects of family income on children’s scholastic
achievement. Our baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase in income raises combined math
and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation. Although modest in an absolute sense,
our estimates are large relative to much of the literature and relative to the OLS and diﬀerenced
estimates reported in Table 2. Duncan, Morris, and Rodrigues (2007) also report IV estimates of
the eﬀect of family income on child achievement that are much larger than their OLS estimates.
Their IV strategy exploits randomly assigned variation in family income supplements from ten
diﬀerent income support and welfare experiments to identify the causal eﬀect of income. Looking
at expansions in the Canadian child beneﬁt program, Milligan and Stabile (2009) ﬁnd even larger
eﬀects of extra income on children’s test scores than we do. Like our approach, these two papers
use exogenous variation in income and focus on relatively disadvantaged families.
We speculate that a variety of factors may be responsible for our larger IV estimates relative to
traditional OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects or diﬀerenced estimates. A ﬁrst possibility is that measurement
error produces attenuation bias for standard methods. Fixed eﬀects and diﬀerenced estimators are
particularly aﬀected by this problem, since changes in income are noisier than income measured in
levels. However, measurement error alone is unlikely to explain most of the gap between our IV
estimates and more traditional estimates. As reported in Section 5.1, the estimated eﬀect of average
income (which should have less measurement error) is 70% larger compared to the estimated eﬀect
of contemporaneous income in OLS speciﬁcations (0.0080 versus 0.0047) but still much smaller
than our IV estimates.
A second potential explanation is that income matters more for disadvantaged families and that
our IV estimates capture the eﬀects of income for disadvantaged families who are aﬀected by the
EITC expansions. Table 6 oﬀers some support for this explanation. Furthermore, Løken, Mogstad
and Wiswall (2010) argue that nonlinear eﬀects explain why OLS and FE estimators ﬁnd little
evidence that family income matters, since these estimates place relatively little weight on poor
families in most studies. To further explore this issue, we split the sample into low, middle, and
high average total family income groups and use OLS to estimate separate eﬀects of income for
each group.21 The eﬀect of a $1,000 increase in average income is 0.026 (s.e.=0.009) for the bottom
21

Given the NLSY oversampling of minorities, our data contains a large number of low and moderate income
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quartile, 0.010 (0.004) for the middle two quartiles combined, and 0.010 (0.004) for the highest
quartile. The eﬀect for the lowest income group is much larger than the eﬀects for higher income
groups and closer to our IV estimates.
A third explanation recognizes that each EITC expansion eﬀectively raised the annual incomes
of eligible families for many years in the future. For example, we estimate that for the median EITC
recipient, the 1993-95 EITC expansion raised total credit amounts over the years 1995-99 by nearly
four times the amount it raised credit amounts in 1995 alone.22 If families are forward-looking
and base their investment decisions on current and expected future income, we would expect them
to respond more to a lasting change in income than to a one-year change. A lasting increase in
income is also likely to alleviate family stress and improve family dynamics more than a comparable
temporary increase. In this case, our IV estimator identiﬁes the eﬀect of increasing annual income
by $1,000 for many years into the future and not just a single year. On the other hand, OLS and
diﬀerence estimators identify the eﬀect of a much more short-lived increase in income, since most of
the underlying variation in income over time is transitory (or measurement error). Thus, it is not
surprising that our IV estimates exceed our OLS and diﬀerence estimators. See Dahl and Lochner
(2005) for a more formal discussion of these issues.
A ﬁnal possible explanation for larger IV estimates may have to do with the nature of EITC
income relative to other income sources. Three features of the EITC are somewhat special. First,
the EITC is typically paid out in lump sum fashion after families ﬁle their taxes (many EITC
recipients even receive an automatic refund at ﬁling), and families may spend these lump-sum
transfers diﬀerently than they spend more traditional income ﬂows (Barrow and McGranahan
(2000) and Goodman-Bacon and McGranahan (2008)). Second, since EITC payments explicitly
depend on having children in the household, families may feel some obligation to spend it on
their children. Third, EITC payments come in the mail with tax returns or are direct deposited
into family accounts. As such, mothers may be more likely to gain control of EITC payments than
fathers (compared to other sources of income). A number of studies empirically ﬁnd that household
expenditures on children increase with the share of family income going to mothers (e.g. Lundberg,
Pollak, and Wales 1997, Attanasio and Lechene 2002, and Ward-Batts 2008).
families. The lowest quartile corresponds to families earning less than $18,031 on average, the middle two quartiles
between $18,031 and $41,790, and the fourth quartile greater than $41,790.
22
To empirically investigate the persistence of EITC gains for families, we divide the cumulative three-year credit increase (for 1995, 1997, and 1999) by the one-year credit increase for 1995 resulting from the large EITC expansion that
(P99 )]−[χ93 (P95 )+χ93 (P97 )+χ93 (P99 )]
took place between 1993 and 1995. Speciﬁcally, we calculate [χ95 (P95 )+χ95 (P97 )+χχ95
,
95 (P95 )−χ93 (P95 )
where χs (Pt ) reﬂects the simulated EITC credit based on the schedule from year s and pre-tax income reported for
year t. Extrapolating based on the median ratio implies that a $1 increase in current EITC income translates into a
$3.88 increase in EITC income over the next ﬁve years.
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6

Conclusion

Understanding the consequences of growing up poor for a child’s well-being is an important research
question, but one that is diﬃcult to answer due to the potential endogeneity of family income. The
question is particularly interesting to policymakers, since part of the explicit rationale for income
support programs (such as the EITC) is to improve the lot of children. Past estimates of the eﬀect
of family income on child development have often been plagued by omitted variable bias. That is,
children growing up in poor families are likely to have home environments or face other challenges
which would continue to aﬀect development even if family income rose substantially.
In this paper, we use an IV strategy to estimate the causal eﬀect of income on children’s math
and reading achievement. Using a panel of 4,412 children matched to their mothers allows us to
address problems associated with both unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous transitory income
shocks. Our IV approach exploits the large non-linear changes in the EITC in the late 1980s and
1990s as an exogenous source of variation in family income levels. The largest of these EITC
changes doubled beneﬁt amounts for some families between 1993 and 1997, accounting for as much
as $2,100 in extra income (measured in year 2000$). Over the time period in our sample, the EITC
expansions raised average family income by more than 10% for EITC eligible families with two or
more children.
We ﬁnd that extra family income has a modest, but encouraging, causal eﬀect for children
growing up in poor families. Our IV results indicate that current income has signiﬁcant eﬀects
on a child’s math and reading test scores. The baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase in
income raises contemporaneous math and reading test scores by 6% of a standard deviation. Over
the entire sample period (1987–1999), the median EITC payment for eligible two-child families
increased by $1,670 (in year 2000$), implying an average test score increase of 10% of a standard
deviation for this group.
Our estimates also suggest that the eﬀects are larger for children growing up in more disadvantaged families, younger children, and boys. The results are robust to a variety of alternative
speciﬁcations, including regressions which account for time-varying state policies, general control
functions, and maternal labor market participation. Simple dynamic models suggest that contemporaneous income has the largest eﬀect on achievement, with small eﬀects from past income. An
interesting avenue for future research would be to explore why income has modest contemporaneous
eﬀects but small long-run eﬀects on achievement.
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Appendix: Methodological Issues
Details on EITC, Tax, and Net Total Income Measures
We create three family income categories based on the many income components in the NLSY:
earned income, unearned income, and non-taxable income. Earned income includes income from
wages and salary. Unearned income includes reported income from a business or farm, unemployment compensation, and a residual catch-all question referring to interest income, social security
payments, net rental income, and income from other regular sources. Non-taxable income includes
income from veteran beneﬁts, worker compensation or disability payments, welfare payments (including food stamps, Supplementary Security Income, or other public assistance), and child support.
All of these measures include income received by the mother as well as her spouse. (Income from
unmarried partners is not included.)
To calculate actual EITC and tax amounts, we use both earned and unearned income, running
them through TAXSIM for the appropriate year.23 These are added (EITC) to and subtracted
(taxes) from pre-tax/EITC income to create our measure of total net family income, Iia . For our
sample period, federal EITC schedules only depend on whether there is one or more child in the
household. Other taxes depend on the number of children and marital status. We include state
taxes and transfers when constructing total family income. Excluding state EITC payments from
the instrument has little eﬀect on the estimates, since there are few states with EITC programs
during our sample period.
To calculate predicted EITC amounts for use in our instruments, we only input earned income (or predicted earned income) into TAXSIM. We do this because unearned income amounts
are generally quite low (and noisy) for persons otherwise qualifying for the EITC, and including
unearned income would require the inclusion of a more complicated control function used in IV
that depended on both earned and unearned income. The analysis is greatly simpliﬁed by leaving
unearned income out, with little sacriﬁced in terms of identifying power.

IV Estimation of the Contemporaneous Eﬀects Model
To understand the implicit assumptions underlying our IV strategy, begin by assuming that α =
β = 0 in equation (3). In this case, IV will provide consistent estimates if
Ea [∆εia |Pi,a−1 , ∆χIV
a ] = Φ(Pi,a−1 ).
The a subscript on the expectation on the left reﬂects that it is taken with respect to the age a
conditional distribution of ∆εia . The key assumptions underlying this approach are (i) the control
function Φ(·) is ﬂexible enough to capture the true expected relationship between child development
shocks and pre-tax income, and (ii) the stability of that relationship over time.
First, notice that Ea [∆εia |Pi,a−1 , ∆χIV
a (Pi,a−1 )] = Ea [∆εia |Pi,a−1 ] if factors aﬀecting the EITC
schedule, sia , do not aﬀect the relationship between shocks to child outcomes and pre-tax income. If
23
While in later years persons with ‘excessive’ interest and dividend income (above $2,200-2,500 depending on the
year) should be disqualiﬁed from the EITC, we are unable to separate this source of income from social security
payments, rental income or other regular sources of income. We eﬀectively ignore this feature of the EITC rules.
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everyone was on the same schedule, this would be trivially satisﬁed since ∆χIV
a would only be a function of pre-tax income. Endogeneity problems can be traced to the relationship between ∆εia and
(Pi,a−1 , Pia ). Stability of this relationship over time (i.e. Ea (∆εia |Pi,a−1 , Pia ) = E(∆εia |Pi,a−1 , Pia )
so the expectation no longer depends on age, a) and stationarity of the income evolution process (i.e. the joint distribution g(Pi,a−1 , Pia ) = g(Pi,a′ −1 , Pia′ ) for all a, a′ ) further implies that
Ea [∆εia |Pi,a−1 ] = E[∆εia |Pi,a−1 ] = Φ(Pi,a−1 ) for a suﬃciently ﬂexible function Φ(·). Note there is
nothing inherently special regarding the use of lagged pre-tax income in this approach; one could
reverse the roles played by current and lagged pre-tax income and include a ﬂexible function of
current income as the control function.
More generally, when α and β are not zero, one can incorporate xi and ∆wia into the control
function. The estimates would then be consistent if
Ea [∆εia |xi , ∆wia , Pi,a−1 , ∆χIV
a ] = Φ(xi , ∆wia , Pi,a−1 ).
Estimating such a general control function can be empirically diﬃcult due to the curse of dimensionality. Most of our regressors are indicator variables. In practice, we explore control functions with
high order polynomials in Pi,a−1 and interactions of those polynomials with all of our regressors.
In general, the inclusion of interaction terms has negligible eﬀects on estimates of our parameters
of interest, and the simpler Φ(Pi,a−1 ) is suﬃcient.

IV Estimation of Models with Lasting Income Eﬀects
Estimating more general ﬁrst-diﬀerence models with lagged changes in income like equation (2) requires additional instruments for each new income term. We use instruments analogous to those desi,a−1
scribed above. For example, when we estimate equation (2) using IV, we use χa−ℓ
(Ê[Pi,a−ℓ |Pi,a−1 ])−
si,a−1
χa−ℓ−1 (Ê[Pi,a−ℓ−1 |Pi,a−1 ]) as an instrument for ∆Ii,a−ℓ . It is still necessary to include the control
function Φ(Pi,a−1 ), and the assumptions discussed above must still be satisﬁed. Notice, all simulated EITC changes are based on the schedule and pre-tax income level as of age a − 1. This
maintains tractability, since it does not require inclusion of other lagged values of pre-tax income
in the control function Φ(Pi,a−1 ). Using diﬀerent lags of pre-tax income to simulate EITC changes
si,a−1
si,a−1
for each lag (e.g. using χa−ℓ
(Ê[Pi,a−ℓ |Pi,a−ℓ−1 ]) − χa−ℓ−1
(Pi,a−ℓ−1 ) as an instrument for ∆Ii,a−ℓ )
would require including each year of lagged pre-tax income levels (used to create the instruments)
in the control function.

Estimating Equations using Two-Year Diﬀerences
Our data only contain measures of child outcomes every other year; however, our model of child
outcomes (equation (1)) is based on annual income. We assume (1) describes child outcomes;
however, we estimate our models using two-period diﬀerences. If we deﬁne ∆2 to be the two-period
diﬀerence operator (e.g. ∆2 yia = yia − yi,a−2 ), then our model implies:
′
∆2 yia = x′i α + ∆2 wia
β + ∆2 Iia δ0 + ∆2 Ii,a−1 δ1 + ... + ∆2 Ii,a−L δL + ∆2 εia .

28

(2′ )

We estimate versions of this equation for L = 0, 1, 2. While estimation of the ‘contemporaneous
eﬀects’ model (i.e. L = 0) does not require income data for years in-between when child outcome
measures are observed, estimation of other models does.
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Figure 1a: Federal EITC Schedules for Families with Two or More Children (Year 2000 Dollars)
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Figure 1b: Two-Year Changes in EITC Schedules for Families with Two or More Children
(Year 2000 Dollars)
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Table 1. Family Income, EITC Eligibility, and EITC Payments over
Fraction of
Children
in EITC
Median EITC
Number of Median Lagged
Eligible
Payment
Year
Children
Family Income
Families
(if Eligible)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

Time (in Year 2000 $)
EITC Payment as a
Fraction of Family
Income (if Eligible)
1 Child 2+ Child
Families Families
(vi)
(vii)

1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000

1,187
1,187
1,648
1,655
1,682
1,349
1,088

23,463
24,858
26,852
28,832
34,988
38,179
38,390

0.31
0.35
0.31
0.35
0.34
0.34
0.34

547
718
833
1,124
1,917
2,035
2,226

0.05
0.05
0.06
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.11

0.05
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.13
0.15
0.16

All

9,796

30,501

0.34

1,129

0.08

0.10

Notes: Data are from the Children of the NLSY linked to their mothers in the main NLSY79. The
unit of observation is a child. The sample is restricted to those used in our baseline IV analysis in
Table 3. Children must have valid math and reading PIAT scores, child control measures in panel
A of Table A1, and family income measures for the reported year. Children must also have at least
two years of valid observations to be included. Year in column (i) refers to the NLSY survey year;
income and EITC payment variables refer to the previous year’s income. Family income includes
tax payments and tax credits (including the EITC); the sources for family income include earned
income, unearned income, and non-taxable income.

Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Eﬀect of Family Income on Math-Reading Achievement
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

0.0047**
(0.0011)

0.0031**
(0.0014)
0.0022
(0.0016)

0.0022
(0.0016)
0.0019
(0.0024)
0.0015
(0.0019)

0.0023
(0.0015)

A. Estimated in Levels
Current Income
Lagged Income (a-1)
Lagged Income (a-2)
Sum of (a-1) and (a-2) Lagged Income

Medium-Term Eﬀect of Increasing
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years

0.0017*
(0.0009)
0.0047**
(0.0011)

0.0053**
(0.0013)

0.0056**
(0.0015)

0.0056**
(0.0015)

0.0011
(0.0007)

0.0015*
(0.0008)
0.0005
(0.0009)

0.0011
(0.0010)
0.0012
(0.0011)
-0.0007
(0.0009)

0.0016*
(0.0009)

B. Estimated in Diﬀerences
Current Income
Lagged Income (a-1)
Lagged Income (a-2)
Sum of (a-1) and (a-2) Lagged Income

Medium-Term Eﬀect of Increasing
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years
Sample Size (for both panels)

0.0001
(0.0005)
0.0010
(0.0007)

0.0020*
(0.0010)

0.0015
(0.0013)

0.0018
(0.0013)

8,609

6,543

5,019

5,019

Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured
in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Panel A ‘levels’ regressions (equation 1) control for all variables listed
in Appendix Table A1. Panel B ‘diﬀerence’ regressions (equation 2) use two-period diﬀerences and
control for baseline variables in Panel A of Table A1. Samples include children taking a math or
reading PIAT test in the 1988 survey year or later. ‘Medium-Term Eﬀect’ is given by the sum of
current and all estimated lagged income coeﬃcients in columns (i)-(iii) and the sum of the coeﬃcient
on current income plus twice the coeﬃcient on the sum of lagged income measures in column (iv).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Signiﬁcant at
the 5% level, *signiﬁcant at the 10% level.

Table 3: Baseline IV Estimates of ‘Contemporaneous Eﬀects’ Model
Combined Math
and Reading
(i)

Reading
Recognition
(ii)

Reading
Comprehension
(iii)

Math
(iv)

Current Income

0.0610**
(0.0231)

0.0359*
(0.0195)

0.0613**
(0.0273)

0.0582**
(0.0273)

1st Stage Coeﬀ. on Instrument

1.270**
(0.381)

1.270**
(0.381)

1.270**
(0.381)

1.270**
(0.381)

Notes: Income is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All speciﬁcations control for ‘baseline
variables’ listed in Appendix Table A1, an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income, and a ﬁfth
order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. All models are estimated in two-year diﬀerences to
account for unobserved child ﬁxed eﬀects. See the Online Appendix for all other ﬁrst- and secondstage coeﬃcient estimates. Sample size is 8,609 for all the columns. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *signiﬁcant at
the 10% level.

Table 4: IV Estimates of ‘Contemporaneous Eﬀects’ Model Accounting for Time Trends and
Time-Varying State Policies (Math-Reading Achievement)
Eﬀect of Current
Income

1st Stage Coeﬀ.
on Instrument

A. Year Dummies

0.0694*
(0.0390)

0.745**
(0.348)

B. Linear Time Trend

0.0863**
(0.0379)

0.847**
(0.334)

C. Linear Time Trend Interacted with Control Function

0.0805**
(0.0399)

1.115**
(0.485)

D. State School Accountability Policies Interacted with
Control Function

0.0533**
(0.0221)

1.299**
(0.406)

E. State Welfare Policies Interacted with Control Function

0.0670**
(0.0268)

1.311**
(0.436)

F. Time Trend, Accountability and Welfare Policies
Interacted with Control Function

0.0630*
(0.0338)

1.193**
(0.513)

Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured
in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All speciﬁcations control for ‘baseline variables’ listed in Appendix
Table A1. All speciﬁcations are estimated in two-year diﬀerences to account for unobserved child
ﬁxed eﬀects. Sample size is 8,609 for all speciﬁcations. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are clustered at the family level. **Signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *signiﬁcant at the 10% level.

Table 5: IV Estimates of Achievement Models with Lasting Income Eﬀects

Current Income
Lagged Income (a-1)

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

0.0436*
(0.0236)
0.0216
(0.0408)

0.0551
(0.0478)
0.0135
(0.0733)
0.0206
(0.0381)

0.0515**
(0.0226)

Lagged Income (a-2)
Sum of (a-1) and (a-2) Lagged Income

Medium-Term Eﬀect of Increasing
Income by $1,000/Year for 3 Years
F-statistics from 1st Stage
Sample Size

0.0186
(0.0254)
0.0651*
(0.0349)

0.0892
(0.0604)

0.0888
(0.0598)

6.17, 3.59

3.98, 1.39, 2.16

5.53, 1.77

6,543

5,019

5,019

Notes: Child achievement is a normalized average of math and reading scores. Income is measured in
$1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All speciﬁcations control for ‘baseline variables’ listed in Appendix Table A1,
an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income, and a ﬁfth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income. All
models are estimated in two-year diﬀerences to account for unobserved child ﬁxed eﬀects. ‘Medium-Term
Eﬀect’ is given by the sum of current and all estimated lagged income coeﬃcients in columns (i) and (ii) and
the sum of the coeﬃcient on current income plus twice the coeﬃcient on the sum of lagged income measures
in column (iii). F-statistics are for tests that all instruments equal zero in ﬁrst-stage equations. See the
Online Appendix for all other ﬁrst- and second-stage coeﬃcient estimates. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *signiﬁcant at the 10% level.

Table 6. IV Estimates of ‘Contemporaneous Eﬀects’ Model for Various Subgroups

Mother’s
Education

Race

Mother’s
Marital
Status

High School
or Less

Black or
Hispanic

Not
Married

Low
AFQT

Age
< 12

Male

Eﬀect of Current Income

0.0536**
(0.0211)

0.0800**
(0.0304)

0.0806*
(0.0463)

0.0708**
(0.0340)

0.0765*
(0.0436)

0.0879**
(0.0446)

1st Stage Coeﬀ.
on Instrument

1.386**
(0.402)

1.281**
(0.428)

0.808**
(0.389)

1.089**
(0.433)

1.050**
(0.495)

1.056**
(0.472)

‘Percent in EITC Range’

56.4

62.8

90.1

64.9

46.4

49.6

Sample Size

6,253

4,602

2,977

4,311

4,654

4,261

Some College
or More
0.0163
(0.0107)

White
(not Hisp.)
0.0146
(0.0295)

Married
0.0434*
(0.0248)

High
AFQT
0.0486
(0.0361)

Age
≥ 12
0.0516**
(0.0235)

Female
0.0399*
(0.0221)

0.086
(1.123)

1.265
(0.798)

2.153**
(0.907)

1.466*
(0.802)

1.460**
(0.452)

1.479**
(0.489)

‘Percent in EITC Range’

30.8

34.1

28.0

33.3

53.0

49.3

Sample Size

2,356

4,007

5,632

4,040

3,955

4,348

Eﬀect of Current Income

1st Stage Coeﬀ.
on Instrument

Mother’s
AFQT

Child’s
Age

Child’s
Gender

Notes: Income is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. All speciﬁcations control for ‘baseline
variables’ listed in Appendix Table A1 and are estimated in two-year diﬀerences to account for
unobserved child ﬁxed eﬀects. ‘Percent in EITC Range’ is calculated as the fraction with lagged
pre-tax income less than or equal to $30,000. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
clustered at the family level. **Signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *signiﬁcant at the 10% level.

Table 7: Robustness of IV Estimates for ‘Contemporaneous Eﬀects’ Model
Eﬀect on
Child Achievement

1st Stage Coeﬃcient
on Instrument

0.0799**
(0.0394)

0.936**
(0.404)

A. Additional Control Variables
Eﬀect of Current Income

B. No Control Variables (Except Control Function, i.e., Polynomial in Lagged Earnings)
Eﬀect of Current Income

0.0657**
(0.0231)

1.318**
(0.380)

0.0608**
(0.0223)

1.310**
(0.384)

0.0645**
(0.0258)

1.186**
(0.387)

0.0508**
(0.0259)

1.241**
(0.477)

0.6393**
(0.2169)

1.211**
(0.298)

C. Interact Control Function with Baseline Regressors
Eﬀect of Current Income
D. Include State Dummies with Baseline Regressors
Eﬀect of Current Income
E. Use NLSY-supplied Weights
Eﬀect of Current Income
F. Log Family Income Measure
Eﬀect of Log Current Income

G. Controls for Mother’s Labor Market Participation and Work Hours
Eﬀect of Current Income
Eﬀect of Mother’s Participation
Eﬀect of Mother’s Work Hours (in 100’s)

0.0841**
(0.0402)
-0.0074
(0.0456)
-0.0262**
(0.0124)

0.901**
(0.371)

Notes: Speciﬁcations identical to those for ‘Combined Math and Reading’ in Table 3 with the noted exceptions. Speciﬁcation A controls for all variables in Appendix Table A1 and state school accountability and
welfare policies (in addition to the control function in lagged pre-tax income). Speciﬁcation B controls only
for the control function. Speciﬁcation C interacts the control function with all baseline regressors. Speciﬁcation D includes state indicators along with all baseline regressors. Speciﬁcation E uses the NLSY-supplied
weights for mothers (includes baseline controls and control function). Speciﬁcation F uses log family income
rather than income measured in levels (includes baseline controls and control function). Speciﬁcation G controls for mother’s labor market participation and hours worked in addition to baseline regressors and control
function. Sample sizes are 8,609 for Speciﬁcations A–F and 8,239 for Speciﬁcation G. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the family level. **Signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *signiﬁcant at
the 10% level.

Table A1: Sample Characteristics for Children, their Mothers, and their Families

A. Baseline Variables
male
age
no siblings
one sibling
two or more siblings
black
hispanic
B. Additional Variables
mother’s age
mother a high school dropout
mother a high school graduate
mother attended some college
mother graduated college
mother’s AFQT score (normalized & age adjusted)
mother lived with both natural parents at age 14
mother’s father present in household
mother’s mother present in household
number of adults in household
highest grade completed by mother’s father
highest grade completed by mother’s mother
mother married last year
age of mother’s spouse
mother’s spouse a high school dropout
mother’s spouse a high school graduate
mother’s spouse attended some college
mother’s spouse a college graduate
year
missing observation indicators:
mother’s AFQT score
mother lived with both natural parents at age 14
mother’s father present in household
mother’s mother present in household
number of adults in household missing
highest grade completed by mother’s father
highest grade completed by mother’s mother
age of mother’s spouse
mother’s spouse’s education
number of child-year observations
number of children

Entire
Sample
(i)

Eligible
for EITC
(ii)

Not Eligible
for EITC
(iii)

Diﬀerence
(ii)-(iii)
(iv)

0.50
11.00
0.10
0.40
0.50
0.35
0.19

0.49
11.23
0.13
0.35
0.52
0.47
0.20

0.50
10.88
0.09
0.42
0.50
0.29
0.19

0.00
0.35**
0.05**
-0.07**
0.02
0.19**
0.01

33.44
0.21
0.53
0.20
0.06
-0.47
0.64
0.03
0.06
1.86
8.42
9.65
0.65
35.39
0.16
0.50
0.20
0.14
1993

33.23
0.29
0.54
0.17
0.01
-0.77
0.57
0.05
0.10
1.67
7.35
8.94
0.37
35.25
0.31
0.52
0.14
0.03
1993

33.55
0.17
0.52
0.22
0.08
-0.32
0.68
0.02
0.05
1.96
8.96
10.01
0.78
35.43
0.13
0.50
0.21
0.16
1993

-0.32**
0.11**
0.01
-0.05**
-0.07**
-0.46**
-0.11**
0.03**
0.05**
-0.29**
-1.63**
-1.07**
-0.41**
-0.18
0.18**
0.02
-0.07**
-0.14**
0.13

0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.08
0.03
0.00
0.00

0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.10
0.03
0.00
0.00

0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.07
0.02
0.00
0.00

-0.01*
0.00*
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03**
0.00
0.00
0.00

9,796
4,412

3,286
2,019

6,510
3,249

Notes: Unit of observation is a child-year, where children and parents can appear repeatedly in the sample.
The sample is restricted to observations used in our IV analysis: children must have valid math and reading
PIAT scores, child control measures (in panel A), and family income measures in a year to be included.
Children must also have at least two years of valid observations to be included. Race of the child is based
on the reported race of the mother. Mother’s education variables represent completed education when the
mother is age 23. Average spousal education and age are reported for the sample of married mothers (sample
sizes are 6,334, 1,228 and 5,106 for columns (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively). In column (iv), ** denotes
statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level, and * denotes statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.

